What the Opposition to Chelsea’s NYCHA Redevelopment Gets Wrong

New York City’s housing crisis is not theoretical. It is visible in rising rents, declining affordability, and — most starkly — in the crumbling conditions of the city’s public housing stock. 

Yet, when a viable, scalable solution finally emerges, opposition materializes with remarkable predictability. The proposed redevelopment of the Fulton and Elliott-Chelsea Houses is a textbook example of how ideology, mistrust of private capital and resistance to change can undermine precisely the kind of progress the city desperately needs.

The plan, advanced by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) in partnership with Related Companies and Essence Development, would replace 2,056 severely deteriorated public housing units with brand-new apartments for every existing resident. In addition, the project would create approximately 3,500 new units —1,000 affordable and 2,500 market-rate — on exceptionally well-located land near the High Line. This is not displacement. It is reinvestment at scale.

Opponents argue that demolishing and rebuilding public housing represents a betrayal of public stewardship. But that framing ignores both the physical reality on the ground and the fiscal reality facing the city. NYCHA’s properties suffer from decades of deferred maintenance and face an estimated $80 billion repair backlog. Roofs leak, elevators fail, heating systems break down, and residents endure conditions that no one would accept in private housing. Preserving buildings simply because they exist — regardless of habitability — does not equate to protecting residents.

The Chelsea site illustrates the deeper structural problem. Like many NYCHA developments, it occupies extraordinarily valuable land while using only a fraction of its development potential. 

Lot coverage at many public housing sites is roughly 12 to 15 percent (confirmed by my Manhattan block-by-block walk to create the Knakal Map Room) compared with 70 to 80 percent for private sector multifamily buildings. Vast open spaces — often poorly programmed and underutilized, many of which provide opportunities for crime — surround aging structures that were never designed to maximize zoning density. This is not a preservation success story. It is a zoning and capital failure.

Redevelopment allows the city to correct both. By rebuilding vertically, residents can move a short distance — often less than 100 feet — into new apartments with modern systems, better layouts and dramatically improved living conditions. At the same time, additional housing can be created on the same footprint, helping relieve pressure across the broader market. By my estimates, at least five times the number of New Yorkers could reside on this land. This “build-to-replace-and-add” model is one of the few approaches capable of improving the quality of life for existing residents while meaningfully increasing supply. And, if you read what I often write — and tell policymakers — the solution to NYC’s housing crisis lies entirely on the supply side. 

Legal challenges to the Chelsea plan underscore how procedural resistance can obstruct substantive progress. A recent ruling by Judge David Cohen denied an attempt by former state Sen. Thomas Duane to block the project, finding that plaintiffs waited too long to bring their case. The judge also noted an obvious but often ignored truth: NYCHA is chronically underfunded, and the redevelopment would replace failing buildings with brand-new housing for all current residents. That truth alone should have been the basis for the denial. 

Critics also warn of financial risk, pointing to loans and long-term obligations associated with the project. But this argument assumes a false alternative — that public housing can somehow be repaired, modernized and preserved through the public sector alone. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests otherwise. Federal support has been shrinking for decades, city resources are finite, and the scale of deterioration is simply too large. Without private capital, the math does not work.

Public-private partnerships are not a philosophical preference; they are a practical necessity. Private developers bring equity, construction expertise and execution capacity that government agencies lack. When structured correctly — with permanent affordability, tenant protections, and long-term public control over outcomes — these partnerships can achieve what the public sector cannot do on its own.

The most troubling aspect of the Chelsea opposition is not its skepticism, but its lack of ambition. If this model works — and there is every reason to believe it will — it should not be an exception. There should be dozens of similar projects underway simultaneously across all five boroughs. In Manhattan alone, rezonings that unlock unused air rights on NYCHA land could yield tens of millions of square feet of new housing and potentially 100,000 new units. Citywide, the impact could be a multiple of that and would be transformative.

Fighting redevelopment in Chelsea does not protect public housing residents. It consigns them to continued neglect. If New York City is serious about addressing its housing shortage and honoring its obligation to public housing tenants, it must embrace demolition and reconstruction where appropriate, scale public-private partnerships aggressively, and stop allowing fear of change to override common sense.

Robert Knakal is founder, chairman and CEO of BK Real Estate Advisors.