How the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Privatization Fell Apart
The Trump administration's push to remove the mortgage giants from government oversight dissipated for a number of reasons
By Brian Pascus November 16, 2026 6:30 am
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Life changes pretty quickly, but perhaps nowhere do changes occur faster, and with less warning, than in Washington, D.C.
It was only 18 months ago that President Donald Trump seemed full steam ahead on privatizing national mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a pair of government-sponsored entities (GSE) which have been under federal control, or “conservatorship,” since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. (The two entities currently carry a loan portfolio estimated at a stunning $7.5 trillion.)
Trump posted about privatization on May 21, 2025: “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are doing very well, throwing off a lot of CASH, and the time would seem to be right. Stay tuned!”
Well, here we are, two weeks after a major midterm election victory by Democrats swept Trump’s Republican party out of control of Congress. Not only is there nary a word on privatization, but even before the drubbing it seems the plan was no longer even on Washington’s radar.
“A new Congress is coming in, and I believe the current administration, and the FHFA, are going to have lot more scrutiny thrown at them than ever before, and their hands will be tied with oversight regarding policies they enacted,” said Clifford Rossi, a former professor of finance at the University of Maryland and former Freddie Mac official, referring to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees the two GSEs. “For those reasons, among others, privatization is dead for the foreseeable future.”
Trump, along with the Treasury Department, had been keen to make a big, bold move. Last summer, in July 2025, they summoned CEOs from the six largest banks to outline a plan to sell up to $30 billion in preferred shares of Fannie and Freddie on the open market, which would have been the largest initial public offering in history (at least before Anthropic entered the picture).

Today, that same plan is viewed as ambitious at best, and generally unfeasible by most market experts.
“While it appears, or seems, that the administration thought [privatization] would be an IPO gangbuster for the taxpayer, it has since discovered the realism of untangling and untethering Fannie and Freddie from government conservatorship is a monumental challenge and would take years to fully disengage,” explained Jeffrey Ketron, a former Fannie official who is senior vice president and head of multifamily agency production at Northmarq.
Others in the know believe the plan was never likely to begin with.
“The GSE reform ‘old hands,’ like myself, all found that the plan was simply not realistic from the very beginning,” said Donald Layton, former CEO of Freddie Mac and senior fellow at New York University’s Furman Center. “But it took on a life of its own through the media, seemingly and mostly egged on by industry and Wall Street commentary.”
Considering the Trump administration was attempting to change the policy directive and market structure of two main arteries in one of the largest financial institutions in the world — Fannie and Freddie fuel roughly 70 percent of the total U.S. housing market — it’s not quite surprising that the privatization seemingly has been abandoned.
“We’re more likely to see incremental administrative changes over the next couple of years than an outright exit from conservatorship, which is likely to fall to a future Congress and a future administration,” said Sam Chandan, director of the Chao-Hon Chen Institute for Global Real Estate Finance at the NYU Stern School of Business.
By all accounts, the market has woken up to the notion that the game is up on privatization, at least for now. Last month, Mizuho Financial Group reduced its estimated probability that privatization of the two entities would occur by 2028 by roughly 12 percentage points, from a 30 percent likelihood for Fannie Mae and 20 percent for Freddie Mac, according to Barron’s.
On Nov. 11, Fannie Mae’s stock traded around $4.43 per share, down 63 percent from its 52-week high, while Freddie Mac’s stock traded around $3.98 per share, down nearly 65 percent from its 52-week high.
To make matters worse, sales of existing homes plummeted to a 16-year low in October, according to The Wall Street Journal.
Since the prospect of privatization was first raised shortly after Trump took office, there were always worrying signs on the horizon. Fannie Mae’s fourth-quarter 2025 net income dropped 14.6 percent year-over-year, while Freddie Mac’s fell 14 percent over the same period, according to Light Tower Group.
Even so, FHFA announced in late 2025 that the 2026 multifamily loan purchase caps for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be set at $88 billion each, representing a 20.5 percent increase from the 2025 caps and signaling to the market that the agencies were prepared for renewed multifamily lending and broader revenue growth.
“Unfortunately, what they didn’t see coming was inflation, interest rate and Treasury rate increases,” said Matthew Swerdlow, a capital services professional at Ariel Property Advisors. “The unintended consequences of privatization would have been increased spreads, and, now that indices went up, it would’ve been a double whammy that would’ve paralyzed production.”
Others, like Tomasz Piskorski, professor of real estate finance at Columbia Business School, argued that war with Iran, and the accompanying geopolitical and economic fallout, made the privatization gambit utterly impossible.
“They recognized the risk of the complexities aren’t as simple as they thought,” he said. “So, even if you could get political consent and could resolve the Treasury issues, my sense is they realized it can’t be done.”
A most dangerous game
But why exactly is privatization of Fannie and Freddie such a difficult, painstaking task?
First is the fact that for the better part of the last 90 years, Fannie and Freddie have essentially controlled the direction of American housing.
Rather than issue mortgage debt, Fannie and Freddie buy and sell mortgages originated by banks and other lenders, and either hold them on their books or securitize them, in turn creating a cycle of capital that fuels America’s housing market. Without Fannie and Freddie’s operation, the 30-year mortgage and much of the American affordable housing market would not exist.
“You’re talking about restructuring one of the largest components of the U.S. financial system,” said Chandan. “There are few aspects of the economy that are more significant than housing — it’s something that impacts every American family, everyone who rents, and everyone who owns.”
To this end, ever since the federal government brought the agencies under its fold during the dark days of 2008, there has always been an implicit (or explicit) guarantee to bail out and backstop the mortgage giants in the event another black swan moment like the GFC were to occur. If both Fannie and Freddie were to be publicly traded companies without the federal guarantee in place, there’s fear that it could drive up mortgage rates, according to Rossi.
“There’s a lot of concern [privatization] could be counter to all the push of housing affordability that we hear about today,” he said. “There’s this idea of, ‘Maybe we should leave well enough alone,’ and the uncertainty of releasing them is a greater risk than letting them do what they’re currently doing.”
Then there are the regulatory impediments, mainly the massive Treasury position that would need to be unwound in some way if Fannie and Freddie were to go private — a dubious proposition, at best.
Fannie Mae’s capital requirement is around $187 billion and Freddie Mac’s is about $141 billion, but the Treasury also holds $192 billion in senior preferred stock, money which doesn’t count toward the agencies’ regulatory capital compliance because that’s taxpayer money that must be paid back — in turn creating a shortfall that is far, far greater than the presumed $30 billion value of any potential IPO.
“The amount of capital truly necessary to truly privatize the agencies is enormous, and I’m not quite sure the capital markets would support that effort,” said Stuart Boesky, CEO of Pembroke Capital.
Institutional investors would also be wary of the fact that the government’s senior preferred liquidation preference, and its 80 percent hold on common stock warrants, puts any investor at risk of facing potential dilution as a common shareholder in the event the IPO falls flat without the government standing behind the agencies. Investors would also have to worry about playing a perpetual second fiddle in the event the Treasury remains there as the implicit backstop.
“The Treasury has a very significant position in the companies, it has preferred equities, and all the dividends of hundreds of billions goes to the Treasury if they were privatized,” explained Piskorski. “Private investors lose the incentive to invest as they would be junior to the Treasury position, but the Treasury keeps its position due to implicit guarantee.”
This, in turn, creates a chicken-and-egg scenario that Layton, former CEO of Fannie Mae, calls “the trap.” Since the current regulatory shortfall is close to $328 billion, and since the best IPO the agencies can secure is $30 billion, then no matter what, even if the offering attracts strong initial support, the federal government will end up in control of the two entities, likely for years (if not decades) after privatization as they aim to retain earnings and build up their base.
“That’s a poison pill to investors, so any such share sale won’t succeed — meaning there is no way forward,” wrote Layton in a July 2026 Substack post. “That’s the trap.”
And, yet, there’s some who argue that Fannie and Freddie are already partially privatized. This view comes out of a program called “credit transfer risk,” a mechanism from 2013 that has allowed the GSEs to sell the risk associated with their mortgage-backed securities to the private market for the last 13 years.
“The GSE’s have a bit of risk, but if losses become substantially high, the risk is with private investors,” explained Piskorski. “So they were partially privatized as they sold the risk of mortgage defaults to the private market.”
The credit transfer risk program originated from the agencies seeking ways to fund the 30-year mortgage, which has been positive for borrowers but an albatross for lenders who must hold that risk on their balance sheet for three decades. After initially using savings and loans institutions to hold home mortgages (a strategy that blew up in the late 1980s and early 1990s), the Federal Housing Administration decided in the late 1990s to pass mortgage-backed securities risk to institutional investors. This worked in theory until investors concentrated the credit risk into one asset class, single-family homes, and the guarantees against credit losses into two companies, Fannie and Freddie. We all know what happened when the housing market tanked and the mortgage-backed securities market blew up in 2008.
The agencies crafted a solution. Novel credit transfer risk transactions diversified the credit risk away from GSEs and broadly through bond and credit markets, in essence by raising private capital to take on most of the credit risk, even as the GSEs stayed in conservatorship, making the agencies more like semi-privatized credit risk intermediaries and less like risk holders.
However, at least according to Layton in several articles he has written, the credit transfer risk system became “hollowed out,” starting in 2021, after having been quite successful up to that point. This was largely as the result of a new capital requirement regime put in place that did not properly reflect market economics and has since seen transactions transfer less risk than before.
This element, along with the position that any privatization would benefit private investors before taxpayers, created a situation where Washington appeared set to privatize gains and socialize costs.
“It seemed like they wanted to revert back to private investors making money off government guarantees,” said Boesky.
One-man show
Seeing as the push to privatization has all but failed, eyes now rest on the one man who controls Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Bill Pulte, the grandson of deceased U.S. housing magnate William J. Pulte and the scion of PulteGroup, one of the biggest multifamily builders in the country.
Only 39 years old, Bill Pulte cultivated a relationship with President Trump from his first term onward and was confirmed by the Senate in March 2025 to be director of the FHFA, whereupon he expeditiously appointed himself chairman of both Fannie and Freddie.
Pulte’s term as the proverbial head of U.S. housing has been tumultuous, largely due to the multitude of unorthodox practices he’s engaged in as chief executive. These include initiating mortgage fraud investigations into Trump political opponents Letitia James, the attorney general of New York; U.S. Sen. Adam Schiff of California; Federal Reserve Board of Governors member Lisa Cook; and even then-Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell. So far, no charges have resulted from any of these investigations.
More surprising, Trump appointed Pulte as the acting director of national intelligence in June 2026 without any congressional approval, despite him lacking any national security experience. Pulte fired nearly one-third of the nation’s intelligence officers in his 45 days on the job.
“By all reports, both public and private, his tenure has been semi-chaotic in style, and the focus has been on a few politicized issues,” said a former agency official who asked not to be identified.

Others were less measured. “Personally, if I were still back in teaching a course, I’d give him a D at best,” said Rossi. “He took eyes off the ball of the housing market by politicizing mortgage fraud referrals on Letitia James, Lisa Cook and Adam Schiff. We really haven’t seen that before, and it gives me pause.”
Rossi listed a litany of other decisions Pulte has made that “have exposed Fannie and Freddie to additional, significant risk through several policies.”
These include mass rounds of layoffs at both agencies, removing board members at each firm, firing Freddie Mac CEO Diana Reid, and shutting down the FHFA inspector general’s office. That office was investigating Pulte for his decisions regarding criminal referrals of Trump’s perceived political enemies, and installing himself as head of regulatory oversight.
Then there’s the policy choices that have defined Pulte’s tenure. These include rolling back homeowner and mortgage insurance requirements and amending tenant protections for multifamily tenants, policies which he’s argued cut costs and serve homeowners.
More importantly, Pulte initiated the policy of “lender choice” — allowing lenders to select between two credit scores — which Pulte said is about reducing the cost of homeownership, and simplifying arcane systems. However, critics like Rossi have argued lender choice exposes the agencies to “significant credit risk.”
“In deciding which loan to submit to Fannie and Freddie, you’ll obviously send the higher credit score if you’re a lender,” he said. “If the loan really has a 680 credit score and not a 720, then Fannie and Freddie are picking up the incremental credit risk without getting compensated for it.”
In a September 2026 X post, Pulte wrote, “We are simplifying mortgage pricing following feedback from lenders and consumers.”
Finally, there is Pulte’s decision to increase the purchases of mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities across the GSEs’ combined portfolio, which has grown from $40 billion to $225 billion during his 20-month tenure. The strategy comes from a desire to lower mortgage rates, but has the potential to expose the agencies to pre-GFC securities risks.
“One of the reasons why both agencies ran into trouble in 2008 is they had gigantic mortgage portfolios that allowed them to act as giant hedge funds,” said Rossi. “This completely reverses the post-2008 guardrails that were in place to restrict size of portfolios, and you’re putting on a lot of exposure to these entities that just isn’t warranted.”
In a January 2026 interview with CNBC about this policy, Pulte said, “We have all this cash, so why not put it to work and into great mortgage bonds that we have? … This is in the best interest of the American people, and it’s in the best interest of the Fannie and Freddie team because these mortgage securities actually yield a higher result and we feel very confident in the mortgage underwriting standards.”
Future fears
As Pulte charts a new course for the agencies, and privatization hits the back burner, the housing market itself now experiences a period of transition, especially as the 10-Year Treasury yield reaches 20-year highs, and mortgage rates climb (and stay) past 7 percent.
Michael Fratantoni, chief economist at the Mortgage Bankers Association, noted that as 2026 began, expectations in the multifamily marketplace were that borrowers who needed to refinance at loan maturities would present opportunities for increased origination activity.
To wit, bank lending for CRE was up 70 percent year-over-year by the end of the second quarter this year, but as rates rose in the third quarter, “things have really slowed down,” according to Fratantoni.
“What we heard from our members is even the sponsors said, ‘We need to take a pause. We don’t want to lock in at this level of rates, so let’s see if they go back down again.’”
Fratantoni added that Fannie and Freddie monthly delinquency rates have risen by more than 70 basis points in recent months, and “look like they’re continuing to increase,” while their year-over-year origination growth was in the single digits (7.1 percent) compared to multifamily originations across all capital sources, which increased by 20 percent.
Shimon Shkury, also of Ariel Property Advisors, noted that the rent-stabilized marketplace in New York, where Fannie and Freddie exert disproportionate influence, could be threatened by a recent change in agency focus.
“They said their underwriting criteria for rent-stabilized housing is going to assume 0 percent growth for the next five to seven years and 5 percent growth on expenses,” said Shkury. “That means their lending criteria will be extremely tight, signalling they might not lend, or will lend very little, on rent-stabilized housing in New York City.”
Moreover, both Swerdlow and Fratantoni independently emphasized that, in a world where multifamily property owners are struggling with flat rents, some are finding better opportunities with private-label commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) rather than GSE debt.
“Where earlier it was just the Fannie and Freddie show, we are now seeing alternatives,” said Swerdlow. “They changed their securitization model and everyone with that appetite said, ‘I have money I need to allocate, my investor likes that specific product,’ and they approached the private-label CMBS market.”
Taken together, as Pulte oversees an increasingly politicized entity, and the housing market itself experiences generational transition, the failed push to privatize Fannie and Freddie might look like a great “What if?” moment for housing as we look back on this period.
“They actually could’ve done something meaningful on this, and they haven’t,” said Piskorski. “There was support behind it, so it’s a lost opportunity in many ways.”
Brian Pascus can be reached at bpascus@commercialobserver.com.